Reinhard Markert
20th November 2020
Recently, there has been no doubt that the relationship between China and the MENA region has taken a notable turn.
This striking shift in geopolitics, fueled by China’s rising hunger for power, will possibly shift the power dynamics in this region from the West to China and the West does not realize it or does not care.
The Early 2000s And The “Arab Spring”
The MENA region was largely excluded from China’s radar and it was not until the early 2000s, when the Arab Spring was ignited, that China embraced a more involved policy toward the principal countries in the region.
Hence, we can say that the Arab Spring designated a pivot point concerning the Chinese engagement in the MENA region; both the tension that came with the Arab Spring, as well as how positively it has been received globally, grabbed the attention of the People’s Republic of China.
From this point onward, China became increasingly proactive in the region as its world domination ambitions grew stronger.
For instance, it was throughout this time that China took part in the clearing of its 40,000 citizens that were caught in the civil conflict in Libya.
This move by China was representative of the more active Chinese presence that developed in the region.
On the other side of the equation, MENA countries found themselves caught in a pickle: dealing with the political and economic repercussions of the Arab Spring, the withdrawal of the U.S. from the region, as well as slow growth due to falling oil prices.
For these reasons, China’s ‘helping hand’ is received with open arms.
China does hold much of what the region lacks, as it offers endless resources such as a strong private sector in technology-related fields, state-owned conglomerates in infrastructure and construction, and state-sponsored financing vehicles such as the Export-Import Bank of China, the Silk Road Fund, and its banks.
However, although the country represents an easy fix for many of the MENA’s developmental challenges, this does not come without a price.
China’s subtle approach and military presence
Playing the role of peace advocate and preaching about development, China’s use of a subtle non-military approach of its navy has been increasingly growing overseas, especially in the Middle East region.
Recently, military transfers surged between China and, Pakistan, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and others in its region.
These interchanges have set the perfect framework for additional military partnerships in the larger Gulf region along with the western Indian Ocean.
For instance, in 2008, parts of China’s navy were dispatched to Somali waters as China launched mutual counter-piracy operations to adjacent regions in order to execute its military diplomacy.
The Chinese military growth has been politically possible thanks to China’s clever and powerful strategy that deploys respect for international boundaries, non-alignment, and non-meddling in other countries’ internal matters.
This is what is meant by “subtle” or “soft” military presence has been able to shield its commercial affairs while also granting assets for the international community and minimizing the risk of damage to multilateral relations.
In contrast to the west (The US, Britain, and France) China has a very different approach.
The West’s positioning in the Middle East is anchored in concerns about threats to national security such as terrorism and the possibility of other great powers seeking political and military dominance in the Middle East.
Moreover, the west is a traditional power that is mainly concerned about their relative position in the region rather than safeguarding their economic, trade, and energy interests of the region.
However, China considers what the West perceives as secondary as a priority.
China has made it its main goal to pay attention to domestic problems (in the MENA region for example) while at the same time it focuses on economic competition and “soft control.”
In addition, the country has made it important to integrate naval diplomacy, combating piracy, disaster relief, and ocean rescue into the functions of its navy.
The execution of this geo-economic plan relies essentially on China’s ability to develop its overseas investment and foster energy and trade partnership intending to reshape the world economic order, especially in the Gulf region,.
As a result, projecting an effortless military presence and building logistical backing sites are now crucial elements of the Chinese military diplomacy.
Furthermore, the Chines military inhabitance overseas has taken three main manifestations.
From 2009 to 2015, China has started by sending 19 naval escort fleets to the Gulf of Aden along with the Somali waters, namely Djibouti, Kenya, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan.
China also stationed three types of navy technical service stops in the Middle East.
The first was aimed toward ship fuel and material resupply, with stops in the ports of Djibouti, Aden, Jeddah, and Salalah.
The second type was set for short-term and is for relatively fixed supply ship berthing and fixed-wing reconnaissance aircraft take-off and landing, such as the stop in Seychelles.
Finally, the last permits total recharge to rest weaponry and take advantage of a large ship repair center, such as the site in Pakistan.
China has also developed provisional technical service stops in Oman and Saudi Arabia along with Djibouti and Sudan.
As a result, the country was able to generate excellent circumstances for strengthening its military occupancy abroad in general and in the MENA region specifically.
China’s Motivations
China’s economic presence in the Middle East embodies a strategic path to enhance its regional strength and influence.
Much of what China has been doing in the MENA region has been economically centered.
The country’s rapid economic growth ambitions required an assertive approach in pursuit of much-needed natural resources as well as national security interests and economic growth goals, which specifically required the uninterrupted flow of oil and gas from the MENA region.
Quickly, China became a major trading partner with Middle Eastern energy exporters, which is not surprising given its status as the world’s largest energy consumer and importer.
Beginning in 2005, the Chinese energy investments in Egypt (along with Greece and Jordan) reached 19.87 billion dollars, with investments in transport for Egypt, Israel, and Greece reaching 11.29 billion dollars in the same period.
From 2012 to 2017, China invested $700 billion in the Middle East, representing a 1.7% increase.
These funds were largely spent in energy, industry, transportation, and defense fields.
However, the trade sheet is not one-sided. China sells a lot to Middle Eastern countries, making for a relatively balanced trade relationship.
In Middle Eastern states without energy wealth, the trade is less even, with China consistently being among the top five sources of imports, and considerably lower as an export destination.
The increased trade relations have also been accompanied by a growth in Chinese financial institutions throughout the region since MENA key countries are also drawing in Chinese institutions and banks to facilitate the tremendous trade growth.
China’s General Strategic Involvement And Calculated Moves In The MENA Region
Because of its increased engagement in the Middle East and North Africa, China has become the biggest investor in the region, and the most desirable.
In 2018, the country successfully committed loans amounting to 3 billion dollars for the banking sector, as well as 20 billion dollars in loans, which were dedicated to the general restoration of the Arab world.
According to the Vice-Chairman of the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT), the 2018 volume of trade between China and Arab countries was worth around 244.3 billion U.S dollars.
In the same year, Chinese firms also signed 35.6 billion dollars worth of new contracts for construction projects and invested 1.2 billion dollars directly in the MENA region.
Also, China increased its Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) which is directly associated with the surge in Chinese investments in the Middle East and North Africa.
The Chinese FDI has been substantial as The China Global Investment Tracker (CGIT) shows over 123 billion dollars worth of Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) related investment into the MENA region since 2013.
China also grew to be the biggest extra-regional source of FDI in the Middle East in 2016, and ever since then has only gotten larger.
Moreover, and through a broad variety of funding means, China has provided currency swaps as well as a mix of concessional, preferred, and commercial loans to assist central banks and finance infrastructure in large-scale projects that use Chinese firms and workforce.
This type of Chinese aid uses a different strategy that does not require any political conditions or obligations, but usually require severe conditions on the usage of Chinese labor and materials.
Additionally, the MENA region has been subject to a thriving presence from China’s private sector firms, particularly from the technology sector.
Chinese tech firms are particularly attracted to the expanding size of the MENA e-commerce market, which is foreseen to reach 49 billion dollars by 2021.
For instance, five of the top 10 e-commerce corporations in the region are Chinese.
China has also been working on developing its tourism in the region.
In 2018, the percentage of total outbound Chinese tourists going to Gulf countries increased from 1.3% in 2012 to 1.9%.
The entanglement with China has been increasingly appealing to MENA countries, as it seemingly does not come with the same type of requirements that often accompany Western deals and aids.
Instead of human rights and political reform, which do not come with China’s strategy, the country vows to strengthen state capacity and improve civilians’ lives through development.
China pointing to its own method of economic growth without political liberalization offers an attractive example for MENA leaders.
Moreover, the Belt and Road Initiative is a catalyst for strengthening China’s Connections with MENA.
The release of this Initiative in 2013 established the strategic value of MENA in China’s international political aspirations. The Belt and Road Initiative is the most ambitious foreign policy program that China has ever undertaken.
Many countries in the Middle East and North Africa region aligned their sustainable development tactics with China’s Belt and Road Initiative, to get better access to financing their clean energy projects.
MENA countries necessitate infrastructure development to support national projects, such as Saudi Vision 2030 as well as rebuilding Syria and Iraq.
For this, Chinese owned companies have been signing deals for mega projects throughout the region.
The Belt and Road Initiative is being received as welcome contrast for people in the MENA, who are used to seeing their region portrayed as an issue in need of solving.
As a result, we can only presume that the China-MENA relationship will continue, especially as the Belt and Road Initiative grows in the region.
China’s Particular Influence In The Gulf Region
China’s critics often emphasize its economic power in the Gulf region by focusing on the menaces posed by corporations such as the telecommunications giant Huawei while others point out that China has an underwhelming record of capital expenditures, job creation, and foreign direct investment.
Nevertheless, both fail to consider a crucial point: that China’s expanding economic power in the Gulf region is best measured indirectly.
The oil and gas sector, solely, makes up for more than 70%of government incomes in most Gulf countries.
The people’s republic of China occupies a huge share of the Gulf region’s exports of these substances.
It also provides digital services to the region’s massive youth population and invests in government-linked companies. Besides, the Covid-19 pandemic as well as the oil price loss of early 2020 allow China the chance to develop and extend its economic impact, notably for the long term.
In 2018, China announced another round of investment and loans amounting to 23 billion dollars, followed by the rollout of a new initiative: the “industrial park-port interconnection, two-wheel, and two-wing approach.”
This identified the Abu Dhabi Khalifa Port, Oman’s Duqm, Saudi Arabia’s Jizan, East Africa’s Djibouti, and Egypt’s Port Said and Ain Sokhna as the homes of key projects that China will develop in building the Belt and Road Initiative in the Middle East.
Additionally, the novel collapse of oil markets amid the Covid-19 pandemic increased the necessity of Gulf nations to improve and seek other revenue sources.
Gulf countries are for instance sustaining fiscal shortfalls that may grow to up to 25%of GDP in 2020.
As such, the Gulf region is actively trying to broaden its economy, but the hydrocarbon sector remains the primary operators of economic growth in the region.
This offers Chinese entities cost-effective opportunities to extend their footholds in imperative sectors in the Gulf. China’s role and involvement is a huge factor when it comes to the ability of governments in the Gulf to designate capital expenditures, job creation, promote entrepreneurship, and launch economic initiatives that lure investment.
However, the privatization of government-related entities and other forms of public-private partnerships are central components of their slow-moving economic diversification strategies.
On another point, even if plans for massive development initiatives and infrastructure projects in the Gulf region may be delayed for budgetary reasons, Chinese companies will proceed to grant technological aid and services for different entities in the Gulf region.
The youth population and citizens in the Gulf are growing familiar with Chinese digital services and applications, opening the way for decades of consumer engagement. Indeed, China’s aiming for the region’s youth could prove to be highly fruitful for Chinese firms.
For instance, attracted by the high per capita income and internet penetration levels among the Gulf region’s youth, Chinese tech giants such as Huawei and Alibaba are in a fierce battle to increase their market share and boost their revenues in the region.
China’s hunger for Gulf hydrocarbon assets could shrink in the future, and new energy market dynamics might change China’s location in the Gulf’s oil and gas sectors.
Meanwhile, continuous Chinese involvement in the region’s non-oil sectors will proceed to grow.
China is not only looking to secure a place at the Gulf’s economic table but also to pose itself to be a substantial ally, economically, in the Gulf economies that will emerge in the future.
Just recently, foreign ministers from the Arab world and China attended their ninth assemblage of the biennial China-Arab States Cooperation Forum, at which they vowed to intensify collaboration in various areas and embrace new opportunities in building a China-Arab community with a shared future.
The meeting aimed to revive debates over the nature of Chinese sway in Gulf Arab states.
China and The United Arab Emirates
China’s relations with the United Arab Emirates developed tremendously recently as Beijing became the country’s greatest trading partner.
For instance, according to Dr. Ali Obaid Al Dhaheri, UAE’s ambassador to China, the bilateral trade between the UAE and China is anticipated to double between the year 2019 and 2021, reaching around 100 billion dollars as reported by Khaleej Times in April 2019.
“Our trade with China will double to $106 billion within the next three years from $53 billion in 2017. We are paying attention across the board but more specifically on food security, energy, especially solar renewable energy, technology, and artificial intelligence,” said the ambassador.
Besides, the Port of Dubai is a fundamental key point of China’s trade throughout the region.
Dubai occupies the Middle East’s largest Chinese population of between 200000 and 300000 and more than 4200 Chinese businesses.
Dubai also entertains branches of China’s 4 biggest banks and in 2018, a currency swap center that moved nearly 7 billion dollars worth of activities in Yuan.
Moreover, the China-Middle East Investment and Trade Promotion Center covers an area of 150,000 square meters in Dubai and there are 3,000 Chinese firms and representative offices as well as 200,000 Chinese expatriates in the emirate.
This makes Dubai the largest expatriate Chinese community.
On the other hand, Dubai Electricity and Water Authority and Tech giant Huawei are exploring ways to reinforce collaboration over digital transformation and artificial intelligence.
For example, TikTok, the viral video-sharing app owned by the Chinese tech firm ByteDance Ltd., has recently opened a regional agency in Dubai.
Tencent, the Chinese multinational technology conglomerate, also released its social messaging and mobile payments program, WeChat, an app with above a billion users.
The tech titan is extending WeChat Pay-enabled services in the UAE.
Dubai also signed the China-based Terminus Technologies as the official robotics associate for the World Expo event, arranged to start in October 2021.
China and Saudi Arabia
In 2019, Saudi Arabia increased its crude oil exports to China by 47%, exceeding Russia to become China’s topmost supplier.
As expected, 2020 has opened even more doors of strategic partnerships between the two countries including trade exchanges that have strengthened over the years.
Currently, around 70 firms, funded by China, employ 16,000 Chinese workers in Saudi Arabia alone.
Just this May, Saudi Arabia sent approximately one-third of its oil exports to China.
In the same year, China’s state-owned Silk Road Fund achieved its acquisition of a 49%share in the renewable energy Saudi Arabia-based ACWA Power, a company operating in power generation and water desalination.
The Silk Road Fund and other Chinese state-owned entities, including the Sinopec Group and China Investment Corp, considered the possibility of participating in the high-profile initial public offering of Saudi Aramco.
Although these investments did not form, Chinese institutional investors continue to be valuable allies for forthcoming initiatives.
Another proof of partnership between the Kingdom and China is the investment agreement between the Saudi investment company BATIC and Huawei to work on smart cities in Saudi Arabia, where the Ministry of Municipal and Rural Affairs supervises a national smart cities program focusing on 17 municipalities.
Saudi officials also declared that the technology-focused fund with ties to Alibaba Group, WTP Arabia, would build its headquarters in Saudi Arabia’s nascent Media City project, which is a planned digital media hub in Riyadh.
At the beginning of October, the Saudi Minister of Islamic Affairs, Dawah and Guidance Sheikh Abdullatif Al Asheikh has been invited by the Chinese Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Chen Weiqing to his office in Riyadh.
During their meeting, the parties shared views on growing the bilateral cooperation of their two countries.
According to Arab News, they also discussed common interest to improve their reciprocal collaboration.
Besides, Mr. Weiqing, along with his delegation of officials from the Chinese Embassy in Riyadh, has previously held a meeting with the assistant secretary-general for political affairs and negotiations of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Abdul Aziz Al Owaisheq.
The two sides dedicated this gathering to discuss ideas to improve collaboration between China and the Gulf region, following the agreements signed between them.
They additionally reviewed matters of mutual interest, and their forthcoming shared meetings as well as the new developments in regional and foreign politics thus showing that Saudi Arabia and China are undoubtedly planning to progress their tight connections and expanding them into a strategic alliance that aims to protect joint interests for the long term.
On another note, maybe the most ironic aspect of the relationship between China and Saudi Arabia has been their newly founded post-Covid-19 bond.
Even though China brought the Covid-19 crisis upon the world, the country is continuously portraying itself as a savior, especially in the Middle East region.
According to the Arab News article published on September 23 titled “How COVID-19 strengthened relations between China and Saudi Arabia”, Mr. Chen Weiqing was proud to discuss the blossoming China-Saudi Arabia relationship and how their bond has strengthened amid the Covid-19 pandemic.
According to the Chinese ambassador, an agreement worth 995 million Saudi Riyal (265.29 million dollars) to face the novel pandemic was signed between the two countries this April.
The agreement also comes along with 9 million nucleic acid tests dedicated solely to the Kingdom as well as laboratories that were put in place in six major areas in Saudi Arabia.
“Relevant cooperation between the two countries has played a positive role in controlling the pandemic and reducing the peak number of cases,” Chen told Arab News.
“China is willing to continue to maintain close cooperation with Saudi Arabia on pandemic prevention and control, and fully supports the Saudi people to defeat the virus at an early date,” He reportedly added.
China Oman and Kuwait
Since 2014, China has consumed more than 70%, of Oman’s entire oil exports yearly.
This number rose to almost 90%, in both May and April. In May, Oman’s Ministry of Information and Communications also agreed with Huawei to improve the country’s digital foundation and support growth in the IT and communications sector.
The situation is quite similar in other Gulf countries like Kuwait, though less intense. China’s use of Kuwaiti crude oil exports has risen unwaveringly from 10.8%, in 2014 to 23%, in 2018.
Additionally, the Chinese share of Qatar’s petroleum gas exports folded from 10 to 20%, over the same period.
China and Lebanon
Handling an intensifying economic crisis with little to no possibility of Western or oil-rich Arab countries assisting without important reforms, the Lebanese cash-lacking government is turning east, aspiring to obtain investments from China that could convey aid and ease to the country.
Recently, Lebanon’s currency has lost about 80% of its value against the dollar, prices have increased out of control, and most of the middle class has fallen into poverty.
Prime Minister Hassan Diab’s government was left with limited choices.
In March, Lebanon also defaulted on its sovereign debt, and the economist Hasan Moukalled said most Western companies would be reluctant to invest there as long as the country does not reach a deal with the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
This is what makes Chinese companies different, he said. Indeed, discussions for bailouts with the IMF and foreign donors declined to grant the 11 billion dollars promised in 2018, pending economic improvements and anti-corruption strategies.
“We understand Lebanon is in desperate need of an infusion of cash. They need investors,” U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon Dorothy Shea told Saudi-owned TV station Al-Hadath. Nevertheless, after Lebanon’s default in March, investors are not lining up at the door.
As a result and amid the support by the Iran-backed Hezbollah and its allies, the Lebanese government has to resort to soliciting aid from China.
The Hezbollah party has been known to promote a more significant role for China and other allies in Lebanon.
China was reported to extend its help to end the Lebanese electrical power crisis using its state corporations.
Besides, it offered to construct power stations, a tunnel that cuts through the mountains to shorten the trip between Beirut and the eastern Bekaa Valley, and a railway along Lebanon’s coast, according to a ministerial official.
Also, Lebanon’s northern port of Tripoli has been developed recently and could be a terminal in China’s trillion-dollar “Silk Road” project that is creating a trade route from East Asia to Europe.
Visiting China on numerous occasions in both 2018 and 2019, Moukalled said that the projects that China has proposed to work on relating in one way or another to Lebanon are worth about 12.5 billion dollars.
China would definitely gain from such deals and close connections with Lebanon but this has to raise the question: would Lebanon’s benefit be as guaranteed? Foreign parties remain skeptical.
“People talked about Lebanon turning east as if that’s the answer to all of Lebanon’s economic issues,” US ambassador Shea added, warning that China’s involvement may come “at the expense of the country’s prosperity, stability or fiscal viability, or, of course, on the long-standing relations with the U.S”.
China and Syria
For China’s ambitions, Syria too, along with Lebanon, depicts a path to the Mediterranean that is an alternative to the Suez Canal.
The US’s withdrawal from Kurdish territory in Syria created uncertainty in China as the country was trying to figure out how quickly its firms could resume business in the war-torn nation, especially as The World Bank estimated that amid the conflict, economic opportunities could reach 400 billion US dollars, making it extremely lucrative.
As such, Beijing took the route of backing President Assad and has adjusted itself with the plans of Iran and Russia for Syria.
As a result, the country established a position of neutrality in international affairs while weakening the US’s strategic advantage.
In addition, agreements between China and Syria to help reconstruct the country’s war-damaged infrastructure have grabbed the world’s attention.
However, it also prevails relatively unimportant in numerical terms.
Chinese electrical, engineering, and construction companies participated in recent Damascus trade fairs.
In Damascus, Chief of the Planning and International Cooperation Commission (PICC), Imad Sabouni, and the Ambassador of China in Syria, Feng Biao signed an agreement on economic partnership, on March 4.
According to this agreement, China made a contribution that will cover the fulfillment of humanitarian projects.
This is a clear new step of China striving to expand its political influence in the MENA region.
Under the same agreement, China granted 100 Million Yuan to the Syrian officials to provide critical humanitarian needs. Since 2019, this was the fifth installment of financial aid to Syria, which amounts to 400 million Yuan in entirety.
Prior contributions were injected to both health care, environment as well as education.
Like other countries, China has upped its concentration on Syria using its obvious Covid-19 diplomacy and tactics. Nevertheless, its gestures are more for show and reputational advertising.
China has delivered what is considered insufficient Covid-19 support to Syria, including exactly 2 cardboard boxes worth of supplies and approximately 2000 testing kits in May and April.
China and Egypt
China’s focus on Egypt is as crucial as its influence in the Gulf region.
In 2019, China was Egypt’s second-largest economic associate with 10 billion dollars in trade as a huge portion of China’s trade with North Africa and Europe goes through the Suez Canal, controlled by Egypt.
In 2018, China granted 18 billion dollars in investments to Egypt, including a co-trade zone along the canal, in addition to infrastructure projects in the energy, transport, and building sectors, along with around 1,300 Chinese companies currently operating in Egypt.
“China is Egypt and Lebanon’s largest source of imports,” said Dr. Paul Sullivan, a professor at the U.S. National Defense University.
Earlier in January, Egypt’s Foreign Minister Sameh Shoukry announced that his country would carry on with collaborating with China on its Belt and Road Initiative, explaining that China’s economic grants were a principal reason for Egypt’s attraction to intensifying the mutual partnership.
Egypt has also been witnessing a surging number of Chinese tourists, receiving almost 450,000 tourists from China in 2018.
“Nearly half a million Chinese tourists visited Egypt in 2018 compared with only 300,000 in 2017, which is a big leap,” says the Chinese cultural counselor to Egypt, Shi Yuewen.
Mr. Shi also expected the number of Chinese tourists to exceed 500,000 in 2019.
As Chinese visitors and investors have become an essential pillar of Egypt’s economy dominating several crucial sectors, even when the Covid-19 pandemic hit the country, Egyptian authorities were unhinged allowing Chinese tourists and investors unrestricted entry to the country.
On February 29 alone, more than 100 Chinese tourists set foot at the Cairo International Airport.
As a result, Egyptian authorities came under fire from the populace over this decision that ignored the rising virus risk that initially originated from China.
Ironically, the recent Covid-19 pandemic marked a new era of cooperation between China and Egypt.
China’s strategic move was the shipment of health care and medical equipment to the country, which received immense media attention. This shows a clear intention of enhancing economic bonds between the two countries.
China’s partnership with Jerusalem
Jerusalem recently made a deal with China that consists in Chinese firms managing the day-to-day operations of Haifa port, which is where the American Navy’s sixth Fleet often performs port visits.
This specific deal reflects the Chinese rising leading position among Israel’s trading allies, building to third largest by 2017.
China and Qatar
Even though China has built an excellent relationship with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, China manages to maintain the same with its now enemy Qatar.
How well the relationship between China and Qatar is established shows the following excerpt of a 2020 July article of the Qatar newspaper Gulf-Times:
“Qatar lent a hand when China faced its most difficult time”. Chinese ambassador Zhou Jian said while speaking on relations between the two countries, particularly during the Covid-19 pandemic.
“We will never forget that when China was at the most difficult time, it is Qatar who lent us a hand. His Highness the Amir had a personal phone call with President Xi Jinping, voicing Qatar’s firm confidence and support to China,” he said.
“China and Qatar will be even deeper. In the next stage, we will continue to work together with the Qatari side, and jointly push bilateral relations to a new future and a higher level,” he noted.
China, Iran, Algeria, Morocco
Similarly, China boosted health and medical aid to Iran in the wake of Covid-19, which has hit the country hard, especially Tehran.
Notwithstanding, trade connections between China and Iran are somewhat unimportant compared to those with other MENA countries.
Algeria has also been a principal aim of Chinese trade in the MENA region. China’s Ambassador Yang Ghuangho expressed that China and Algeria decided to build a new shipping port in Cherchell, an Algerian city and that the port’s capacity is projected to be from 3 to 6 million freight containers yearly, compared to the current 800000 containers.
In 2018 alone, Algerian importing reached 8 billion dollars in goods and services from China.
On a similar occasion and during a fresh visit to Morocco, Chinese Middle East trade representative, Zhuhai Jon, emphasized that trade between the two countries had seen a substantial boost, including Chinese imports of minerals and nearly 200000 Chinese tourists visiting the country.
Reciprocal Initiatives
China’s extra committed involvement in MENA was notably reciprocated by high-level visits by officials from the region to China.
Multiple Middle Eastern leaders visited Beijing numerous times over the past five years.
For instance, Egyptian President Abdel-Fattah El-Sisi visited the Eastern country around six times in the last six years. Every visit included the signing of some sort of economic agreement as both countries tried to strengthen their political relationship as well as increase their economic bonds.
In 2019 alone, Egypt’s President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi, Qatari Emir Tamim bin Hamad, crown prince Mohammad bin Salman and Mohammed Bin Zayed have all visited China. During their visits, each country signed a list of significant contracts.
These visits all symbolize deepening mutual relationships that are going to result in China transforming into a major economic and political powerhouse in the MENA region.
China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims Doesn’t faze Arab Countries
For years, China has been going out of its way to take over Xinjiang, the autonomous region in northwest China, and home to many ethnic minority groups, including the Muslim Uyghur people.
According to several reports, thousands of mosques in Xinjiang have been targeted, vandalized, and torn down in the last couple of years by China.
The damage reached a total of two-thirds of the area’s mosques as well as 50% of cultural areas, including the total demolition of the Uyghurs’ shrine, Ordam Mazar.
As a result, Xinjiang now has a diminishing number of cultural and religious sites.
“This is the lowest number since the Cultural Revolution when fewer than 3,000 mosques remained,” said the thinktank’s report on Chinese oppression of Muslim minorities.
China has recently been facing serious accusations backed by mounting proof of human rights violations in Xinjiang towards millions of Uighurs and Turkic Muslims who were held prisoners by the country in detention camps.
The Chinese government is facing serious proof-backed blame for forcing millions from the Uighur minority into work camps that China disguises as an anti-terrorism campaign and referring to it as “vocational training” and “re-education programs”.
Just this October, Beijing additionally went as far as banning personal pilgrimages to Mecca for all Chinese Muslims.
The country has required Muslims to prove that they are law-abiding patriotic citizens before they are permitted to perform haj.
These new oppressing rules came under a recent law that China claim will protect national security.
The new legislation is the newest ploy by China to exercise authority over the minority Chinese Muslim population.
China also decided to halt private haj trips and declared that all pilgrimages will from now on be arranged through the state’s Islamic Association.
Besides, pilgrims will be ordered to go through a vetting as well as what China calls an “education” process that will ironically be attended by parties from Saudi Arabia.
Beijing also stressed that all pilgrims who try to travel individually will be facing prosecution.
In face of this Chinese oppression and discriminatory actions towards Muslim minorities, Arab countries remain oddly silent on the topic while they continue building amicable relations with the country.
What the future holds for China
There is no doubt that China will proceed to utilize its military in the service of its geo-economic plan.
China will keep strengthening its trade and economic exchanges with the Middle East, complementing them with a subtle military presence that is revolving around the relatively China’s overseas aspirations.
The country’s convoy fleet in the Gulf of Aden and Somali waters will play a bridge-like part in case of a natural catastrophe or any other crisis requiring relief or evacuation.
As such, trade roads linking China to the Middle East are extremely valuable to the country as the region represents the center connecting European and African trade with China.
Moreover, China’s soft military occupancy in the Middle East will proceed to follow the “Chinese way” of diplomatic principles that refuse the Western overseas military deployments, authority, and power politics.
As a result, China’s rising mild military approach in the region will allow it to guard its own interests while also play a participating part in regional governance.
Additionally, by continuing to preserve and expand its economic interests in the Middle East, China will be able to build its wealth and achieve a progressive and peaceful transfer of global power.
This is also expected to enable China to form a new standard for great power relations.
Result
The USA and the UK (Operation Shader), along with others in the west, have joined the war in Syria sacrificing soldiers in the process while investing huge amounts of money to support Syrians.
In comparison, China has done nothing.
Instead, the country is happily making deals with Assad, even managing to establish amicable relationships with the two warring parties: Qatar on one hand, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates on the other.
Consequently, we can only deduce that The West must be doing something wrong in the MENA region.
